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COMMENTS
EMPLOYERS' USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS
UNDER TITLE VII
Persons with criminal records' often have an inordinately difficult time
securing and maintaining employment.' Not only are they handicapped
by their typically limited job experience and educational qualifications,3
but they are also placed at a severe competitive disadvantage by their ar-
rest or conviction records. Most employers solicit information from appli-
cants regarding their criminal records,4 and where such a record is found,
it is often used automatically or effectively to disqualify the applicant from
employment.5 Even in the rare case when the employer does not use the
criminal record information to make hiring decisions, its mere solicitation
may discourage applicants with such records from applying.6
These barriers to employment, besides affecting individuals who have
criminal records, also frustrate policy goals of reducing recidivism and
promoting equal employment opportunities. It has often been hypothe-
sized that unemployed ex-offenders are much more likely to commit future
I. This includes both persons with arrest records only and those with arrest and con-
viction records. As used in this article, the term "ex-offender" refers exclusively to a person
who has been convicted of a crime. Although the term is also frequently used in the litera-
ture to refer to persons who have only an arrest record, such an application is improper,
because arrest alone is not very strong evidence that the arrestee actually violated a criminal
code. See Zeisel, The Future of Law Enforcement Statistics, in 2 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
FEDERAL STATISTICS 540 (1971).
2. See Feyerherm, The Employment History of Prison Releases, in STATE MANPOWER
COUNCIL - MADISON WISCONSIN, THE GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE ON EMPLOYMENT AND
THE PREVENTION OF CRIME 145, 145-48 (1976) (of all prisoners released from confinement
in 1974, only 54% were fully employed one year later and 34.4% were completely unem-
ployed); G. POWNALL, EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS OF RELEASED PRISONERS 48-49 (1969)
(62.6% of released prisoners under federal supervision were fully employed in 1965 com-
pared to 81% of the national civilian work force).
3. The work experience of 43.4% of all ex-offenders, compared to only 17.2% of the
work force as a whole, is limited to unskilled labor or service work. Only 17.7% of ex-
offenders have 12 or more years of education, compared to 45.3% of the entire work force.
Sullivan, Changes in Correction. Show or Substance?, 3 MANPOWER 2 (Jan. 1971).
4. Jensen & Giegold, Finding Jobs/or Ex-Offenders- A Study of Employers'Attitudes,
14 AM. Bus. L.J. 195, 203 (1976). See notes 14, 15 infra.
5. Jensen & Giegold, supra note 4, at 203-05. See notes 20, 22-23 infra.
6. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 5304 (1979). The request for criminal record infor-
mation also tends to induce false or incomplete answers that often lead to the applicant
being rejected or the employee being discharged. Id See text accompanying notes 104-06
infra.
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crimes than those who find suitable employment.7 Studies indicate that
minorities suffer a disproportionate number of arrests and convictions.
For example, one study indicates that eighty-five percent of black male
adults have arrest or conviction records of some kind.8 Since a dispropor-
tionate number of those who are denied employment by the use of crimi-
nal records are minorities, the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19649 are implicated. Under the Act, it is illegal for an employer to
discriminate because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin."0 The Act prohibits not only discriminatory treatment, but
also discriminatory effect; that is, the unintentional exclusion of a dispro-
portionately high number of members of designated classes unless the ex-
clusion is justified as being job-related. "
Although several courts have held that an employer's use of criminal
records without a sufficient job-related justification violates Title VII when
it adversely impacts on minorities,12 such use of criminal records is never-
theless widespread.' 3 This Comment will examine the application of Title
VII to an employer's use of criminal records - particularly from the per-
7. D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 359, 487-90
(1964); G. POWNALL, supra note 2, at 4-6.
8. N. MILLER, A STUDY OF THE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH RECORDS OF ARREST OR
CONVICTION IN THE LABOR FORCE 21 & n.2 (U.S. Dep't of Labor Technical Analysis Paper
No. 63, Jan. 1979). Although blacks represent 11% of the population, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE U.S.: AN
HISTORICAL VIEW 1790-1978 9 (1979), they account for approximately 26% of all arrests.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1977 186 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS - 1977].
Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that the conviction of blacks comes to three or four
times their proportion in the population. Wolfgang & Cohen, The Convergence ofRace and
Crime, in RACE, CRIME AND JUSTICE 70, 74 (C. Reasons and J. Kuykendal, eds. 1972).
There is considerable evidence for the proposition that arrest and conviction records over-
state the amount of crime committed by blacks in relation to the amount of crime committed
by whites. In one study of juvenile crime, it was estimated that black youths engaging in
criminal ativity were three times more likely to be apprehended than criminal white youths.
Chambers & Nagasawa, On the Validity of Official Statistics. A Comparative Study of White,
Black and Japanese High School Boys, 6 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 71 (1968). See gener-
ally M. WOLFGANG & B. COHEN, CRIME AND RACE 37 (1970); Arrest Records as Racially
Discriminatory Criteria, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 165, 169-71 (1970).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e17 (1976).
10. Id § 2000e-2(a), stated in note 38 infra.
11. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
12. See McBride v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 551 F.2d 113 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
927 (1977); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Gregory v. Litton
Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. Ohio
1975); EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afid as
modified, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp.
519 (E.D. La. 1971), a/I'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
13. See generally N. MILLER, EMPLOYER - BARRIERS TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF PER-
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spective of the black applicant or employee - with the goal of evaluating
the cause of the apparent inconsistency between the legal standard and the
pervasive employer practice.
I. EMPLOYER PRACTICES WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL RECORDS
Employers routinely seek to determine whether job applicants have
criminal records. Two recent national surveys suggest that a majority of
employers solicit criminal record information on their application forms,'4
and a significant number also obtain criminal record information through
applicant interviews, background investigations, credit checks, and police
agencies.' 5 Since larger employers more frequently obtain such informa-
tion than do smaller employers,16 it appears that a large majority of avail-
able positions are filled by employers with access to applicants' criminal
records.
Although some employers use these arrest' 7 and conviction' 8 records to
SONS WITH RECORDS OF ARREST OR CONVICTION (U.S. Dep't of Labor Technical Analysis
Paper, June 29, 1979).
14. In a 1976 survey of employers, 79% of the respondents reported that they solicit
arrest and conviction records on application forms. Jensen & Giegold, supra note 4, at 205-
06. While 79% of the respondents to the Jensen and Giegold survey solicit criminal records
on application forms, only 50% of the respondents to the 1976 Personnel Practices Form
Survey report collecting criminal record information on application forms. Compare Jensen
and Giegold, supra note 4, at 205, with BNA, Selection Procedures and Personnel Records,
PPF Forum No. 114, 2 (Sept. 1976) [hereinafter cited as BNA]. Part of the discrepancy may
be explained by a peculiarity in the BNA questionnaire. The questionnaire asked whether
"police/arrest record" is included on application forms. Thirty-nine percent responded af-
firmatively without comment while an additional 11% wrote in that their form seeks infor-
mation on convictions only. It is likely that additional firms seek conviction record
information exclusively and answered in the negative to the police/arrest record question.
15. These methods may be used to verify or supplement the application form informa-
tion. Forty-five percent of respondents to the Jensen and Giegold survey obtain arrest and
conviction records through credit or security investigations, 6% through interviews with ref-
erences, and 14% through police records. Jensen & Giegold, supra note 4, at 205-06. Forty-
seven percent of respondents to a 1974 survey replied that they attempt to verify arrest and
conviction information that applicants give them. Beason & Belt, Verifying Job Applicants'
Background, THE PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR 29 (Nov.-Dec. 1974).
16. See BNA, supra note 14, at 2 (43% of large and 34% of small companies solicit
police/arrest record information on their application form). See also E. Tromanhauser, The
Attitudes and Practices of Chicago Area Employers Regarding the Hiring of Ex-Offenders:
A Survey 12 (Jan. 1976) (report prepared for the Manpower Administration, U.S. Dep't of
Labor).
17. Thirty-nine percent of the respondents to the BNA survey reported that po-
lice/arrest record information is required on all application forms. BNA, supra note 14, at
2. Even though employers are aware that the practice was invalidated in Gregory v. Litton
Sys. Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aft'din relevant part, 472 F.2d. 631 (9th Cir.
1972), Jensen and Giegold report that employers continue to seek such information on. ap-
plication forms. Jensen & Giegold, supra note 4, at 205.
1980]
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reject candidates outright, most do not automatically eliminate candidates
simply because they have been arrested or convicted.' 9 It is generally
agreed, however, that the presence of an arrest or conviction record is det-
rimental to a job applicant and that persons without criminal records have
an advantage. 2° Just how detrimental a criminal record may be depends
on several factors. The type of crime involved, the presence or absence of
multiple convictions, experience of the applicant since his last conviction,
18. A significant number of employers fail to distinguish between applicants who have
been convicted and those who have only been arrested. See H. MILLER, THE CLOSED
DOOR: THE EFFECT OF A CRIMINAL RECORD IN EMPLOYMENT WITH STATE AND LOCAL
PUBLIC AGENCIES 147-49 (1972) (arrest records constitute an obstacle to employment even
where there has been no conviction); R. Winston, A Study to Determine How Personnel
Managers' Perceptions of Risk and Deservedness Affect Their Evaluation of Ex-Offenders 7
(Oct. 6, 1975) (Unpublished Harvard University M.B.A. thesis) (". . . being arrested
aroused suspicion and anxiety [among hirers surveyed] not only when no guilt was proven,
but also where complete innocence was proven."). Some employers do not adequately un-
derstand the difference, see H. MILLER, supra, at 150, and others are misled by criminal
record forms that do not reveal dispositions. See J. BREITENEICHER, THE EMPLOYMENT
PROBLEM OF OFFENDERS: A PRIMER 7 (Employment Law Center, Legal Aid Soc'y of S.F.
1974) [hereinafter referred to as Employment Law Center].
19. Eighty-nine percent of respondents to the 1975 Chicago-area survey stated that they
would consider hiring individuals with conviction records while the remaining 11% stated
that they would not. Sixty-seven percent of respondents have hired applicants with such
records in the past, 9% have not, and the remaining 24% do not know. E. Tromanhauser,
supra note 16, at 10-1i. Eighty-two percent of employers surveyed by Jensen and Giegold
do not have a formal written policy. Of those that do, less than 3% prohibit the hiring of
persons with arrest records. Jensen & Giegold, supra note 4, at 202-03. Tromanhauser hy-
pothesizes four possible reasons for a company not having a formal policy: (i) the issue does
not require a policy; (2) the issue does not arise frequently enough; (3) there is an unwritten
policy that they do not wish to disclose; and (4) they prefer to treat each case on its merits.
E. Tromanhauser, supra note 16, at 9-10. Because most companies lack uniform policies
with respect to criminal records, the way in which they are used remains somewhat a mys-
tery. One reason that it is difficult to determine how applicants with criminal records are
treated is that employment decisions can be made at various levels of management depend-
ing on the company's structure and the nature of the job. See Jensen & Giegold, supra note
4, at 200-02. Other reasons that employers are reluctant to reveal their policies include fear
of upsetting the neighborhood, of being sued, or of being bombarded with applicants. Pati,
Business Can Make Ex-Convicts Productive, 52 HARV. Bus. REV. 69, 71 (1974).
20. Respondents to Tromanhauser's survey were asked to indicate the policy that most
accurately reflects company policy with respect to individuals with conviction records.
Eighteen percent of the respondents reported that such convictions would automatically or
usually disqualify the applicant. Thirty-nine percent said that although decisions are based
on individual merit, persons without conviction records are preferred. Twelve percent con-
cluded that persons with several convictions would probably not be considered, and 30%
replied that a felony conviction alone would never disqualify an applicant. E.
Tromanhauser, supra note 16, at 22. See also R. Winston, supra note 18, at 7-8 (employers
responding to a 1975 Boston-area survey demonstrated a negative bias to ex-convicts and
also to persons who had been arrested and tried, even though not convicted); Employment
Law Center, supra note 18, at 7 (employers react negatively to all arrest and conviction
data).
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and the type of job involved are all often considered by an employer.2 1
Since violent crimes or those involving larceny are the greatest concern to
the employer;22 the applicant who has committed such crimes is often au-
tomatically rejected 23 regardless of whether that criminal activity is partic-
ularly related to the job sought.24 While the presence of multiple
convictions is generally not an absolute bar to employment,25 employers
are less apt to reject youthful first offenders.26 In their hiring decisions,
employers also consider the amount of time that has passed since the ap-
plicant was convicted 27 and how he or she has done in work or rehabilita-
tion programs. 28 Even if an applicant with a criminal record fares well
with respect to these criteria, however, there is evidence to suggest that the
applicant's chances of being hired for a job commensurate with his or her
abilities are slim unless there is a labor market shortage29 or the applicant
21. See N. MILLER, supra note 13, at 46-50; Farkas, Industrial Employer Attitudes To-
wards Hiring Men with Criminal Records, THE PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR 6 (July-Aug.
1974); Jensen & Giegold, supra note 4, at 203-05; Cayton & Schutz, Barriers to the Employ-
ment of Released Male Offenders 4 (U.S. Dep't of Labor, Manpower Ad., Mar. 1970).
Other factors that have been considered are personal attractiveness, N. MILLER, supra note
13, at 51-52, and the employer's perception of the sufficiency of the punishment that the
applicant has received. R. Winston, supra note 18, at 3-6.
22. See Atkinson, Fenster & Blumberg, Employer Attitudes Toward Work-Release Pro-
grams and the Hiring of Offenders, 3 CRIM. JUST. AND BEH. 335, 338 (1976) (those convicted
of murder, rape, and muggings are the least likely to be hired by the employers surveyed);
Farkas, supra note 21, at 6 (employers do not want those who have been convicted of mur-
der, sex offenses, narcotics offenses,and drunkenness); E. Tromanhauser, supra note 16, at 18
(the six crimes most disfavored by respondent employers are murder, rape, armed robbery,
larceny, forgery, and embezzlement).
23. More than 50% of Tromanhauser's respondents stated that conviction of a violent
crime is a bar to employment. Twenty-three percent concluded that a theft conviction is also
a bar to employment. E. Tromanhauser, supra note 16, at 20-21. See also Farkas, supra
note 21, at 6.
24. Jensen & Giegold, supra note 4, at 203. However, the type of offense is an impor-
tant consideration in some businesses. See id
25. See E. Tromanhauser, supra note 16, at 19-20 (only 6% automatically bar those with
multiple convictions). But see Cayton & Schutz, supra note 21, at 4 (74% of employers
surveyed prefer not to hire recidivists).
26. Jensen & Giegold, supra note 4, at 204-05 (many respondents indicated that they
wanted to give youthful offenders a second chance); Cayton & Shutz, supra note 21, at 5
(more than half of the respondents indicated a hiring preference for young first offenders).
27. Personnel officers interviewed by Jensen and Giegold indicated that the length of
time that has lapsed since the last offense is an important factor in their decision. However,
the minimum amount of time that was thought to be necessary to indicate rehabilitation
varied widely - from "three months" to "five to ten years." Jensen & Giegold, supra note
4, at 204.
28. See N. MILLER, supra note 13, at 52-55 (employer concern can be reduced by third
party credentialing); Farkas, supra note 21, at 7 (letters and statements of recommendations,
references, and previous work records are important factors).
29. See Farkas, supra note 21, at 7 (apparel and metal products manufacturers ar6 gen-
1980l
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is a friend or relative of a company employee.3°
Despite the substantial use of criminal records in the employment mar-
ket, there is little evidence to suggest that ex-offenders and those with ar-
rest records are inferior workers or that they present significant safety
risks. In fact, several studies suggest that ex-offenders perform as well as
or better than other workers. 3' In a Maine study, for example, the major-
ity of respondent employers rated ex-offenders' work as quantitatively and
qualitatively superior to that of the other workers.32 The majority also
rated their integrity and ability to work well with others as superior, 33 and
most of the ex-offenders were readily accepted by their peers.34 In regard
to the risk presented by ex-offenders, a Wisconsin study revealed that of
more than 1,000 Wisconsin parolees, only fourteen had been accused of
job-related crimes a year after release. 35 Damages for the fourteen inci-
dents totalled only $1,375, and there were no injuries to other persons.36
Similarly, a federal bonding program suffers a less than two percent loss
rate for the more than 12,000 bonded ex-offenders.
37
In summary, despite the lack of evidence to suggest that arrestees or ex-
offenders are either inferior workers or are more likely than other workers
to commit crimes that would be injurious to the employer, most employers
make use of criminal record information. This traditional reliance on
criminal records in employment decisions limits job opportunities for
many capable and reliable workers. Because a high percentage of those
excluded are minorities, Title VII may provide relief in a substantial
erally predisposed to hire the criminal offender - but only in the absence of equally quali-
fied nonoffenders); Pati, supra note 19, at 72 (one large manufacturer interviewed has a
generally restrictive policy but seeks ex-convicts when there is a labor market shortage).
30. See Pati, supra note 19, at 72, 75.
31. See Jensen & Giegold, supra note 4, at 198 (the motivation level of ex-offenders
tends to be higher than the average found in the nonoffender work force); Pati, supra note
19, at 74-75 (companies that have ex-offender hiring programs report that ex-convicts have
at least no greater work problems than any other group of employees - turnover rules and
disciplinary problems are less).
32. The researcher surveyed Maine employers who had accepted referrals from an ex-
offender placement program. Employers were asked to compare the ex-offenders with non-
offenders on 10 dimensions of performance. Ex-offenders were rated as superior on all
dimensions except longevity. Seventy-seven percent of respondents rated ex-offenders'
quantity of work as superior to that of nonoffenders. Seventy-one percent rated the quality
of their work as superior. Jolson, Are Ex-Offenders Successful Employees?, 17 CAL. MGT.
REV. 65, 67 (1975).
33. Ex-offenders were rated superior in integrity by 62% of respondents and as superior
in cooperativeness by 71.2% of respondents. Id at 67.
34. Ex-offenders were rated as superior in acceptability by 75% of the respondents. Id
35. Feyerherm, supra note 2, at 158.
36. Id
37. N. MILLER, supra note 13, at 16.
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number of cases. Unfortunately, however, there are many subtle nuances
in the statute that may impair an aggrieved claimant's chances of prevail-
ing. Moreover, the limited enforcement of this aspect of the law by federal
authorities poses additional difficulties.
II. TITLE VII RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS
While an employer's purposeful discrimination against an individual on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is patently unlawful
under Title VII,3 8 employer practices that unintentionally have the effect
of discriminating are likewise illegal.39 An employer can justify an em-
ployment practice that latently discriminates against an individual only by
demonstrating that it is job-related.4" Accordingly, many courts have
found the use of criminal records in employment decisions to be a viola-
tion of Title VII where the records have an adverse impact upon blacks or
others protected by Title VII, and are not shown to be job-related.4' This
is a straightforward principle in the abstract, but there is considerable con-
troversy over the appropriate manner of determining adverse impact and
job-relatedness. Since both of these elements significantly affect the appli-
cability of Title VII to any given employment decision, they are important
concepts to examine.
A. Measuring the Adverse Impact of a Criminal Record Selection
Device
Depending on the circumstances of the alleged discrimination, the ad-
verse impact of a single selection criterion can be gauged by either of two
methods. The "applicant flow" method compares members of a protected
group who actually applied for the given position with all other applicants
for that position. A given selection criterion, such as a height requirement,
38. Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
39. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court struck down the power
company's use of written tests and its high school prerequisite as violations of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(2) (1976) because these job requirements eliminated a disproportionate number
of black applicants without a job-related justification. 401 U.S. at 431.
40. Id. See notes 68-90 and accompanying text infra.
41. See note 12 supra.
19801
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is said to have an adverse impact on the protected group if the percentage
of that group eliminated by the criterion is significantly greater than the
percentage of persons eliminated by it in other groups. 42 For example, in
order to determine whether an employer's use of criminal records has an
adverse impact on blacks, the percentage of black applicants who were
eliminated because of criminal records is compared with the percentage of
other applicants so eliminated. The second procedure, the "population co-
hort" method, considers characteristics of the population at large by com-
paring members of a protected group in the general population with the
rest of the populace. With this method, a selection criterion is considered
to have an adverse impact on the protected group if the percentage of that
group in the population at large who would be adversely affected by that
criterion is larger than the percentage of other groups in the general popu-
lation who would be so affected. 43 By this method, an employer's rejection
of applicants with criminal records is said to have an adverse impact on
blacks where the percentage of blacks in the population with criminal
records is higher than the percentage of whites with criminal records.
Unfortunately, neither method is entirely satisfactory. The applicant
flow method fails to account for persons who would have applied were it
not for their foreknowledge that they would be rejected. This may consid-
erably understate the actual adverse impact a challenged practice may
have on a protected group. The population cohort method may not accu-
rately reflect the true percentage of persons who would apply for the con-
tested job. For example, although a larger percentage of blacks than
whites in the general population may have criminal records, it may be,
with respect to a particular job, that the blacks who would be attracted to it
do not display a higher incidence of criminal behavior than do whites at-
tracted to the same job. In this instance, the use of the population cohort
method incorrectly indicates that an adverse impact exists.
Since criminal record cases involve a chilling effect, that is, a tendency
to discourage applicants who have foreknowledge that arrest or conviction
records will be used, the better approach is to allow a plaintiff to demon-
strate disparate impact by the population cohort method.44 While the pop-
42. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971) (use of a battery of
standardized tests had an adverse impact on black applicants because the battery resulted in
58% of whites passing the tests as compared with 6% of the blacks). See generally F. MOR-
RIS, JR., CURRENT TRENDS IN THE USE (AND MISUSE) OF STATISTICS IN EMPLOYMENT DIs-
CRIMINATION LITIGATION 96-103 (1978).
43. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971) (use of high school
graduation as a criterion for job qualification had an adverse impact on North Carolina
blacks).
44. This method has been widely accepted in criminal record cases. See Carter v. Gal-
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ulation cohort method is also subject to error, it is preferable to the
applicant flow method because the chance of error is neither as likely nor
as one-sided in its effect. The Supreme Court reached a similiar conclu-
sion in Dothard v. Rawlinson,4" where a female plaintiff contended that an
employer's height requirement had a disparate impact on women. In view
of the chilling effect that a height requirement can be expected to have on
many potential women applicants, the Court held that national statistics
on the disparate impact of a height requirement are preferable to applicant
flow data.46
Despite its advantages over the applicant flow method, however, the
population cohort method could still benefit from two refinements narrow-
ing the population sample to likely candidates for the position in question.
First, the population cohort can be limited to the geographic region from
which the employer draws applicants. The Supreme Court has endorsed
this refinement47 but also has held that national statistics are sufficient to
demonstrate disparate impact where there is no reason to believe that the
regional distribution is different from the national distribution.48 Demon-
strating the disparate impact of the criminal record requirement with re-
spect to a particular region should not be considered an undue burden on
plaintiffs because county and Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area spe-
cific data are available from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and be-
cause it is unlikely that there is a region in the country where the use of
criminal records does not have a disparate impact on minorities.
4 9
The second way to refine the population cohort demonstration of dispa-
rate impact is to compare only those who have the requisite qualifications
for the job. To the extent that this showing is generally required only for
jobs that require specialized skills, such as lawyer or teacher positions, and
not for jobs requiring skills that are commonly possessed or easily at-
tained, such as factory worker, police officer, or bank teller positions,5" it
lagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Dozier v. Chupka, 395
F. Supp. 836 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519
(E.D. La. 1971); EEOC Dec. No. 72-1497, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 849 (1971); EEOC Dec.
No. 71-6282, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 25 (1971).
45. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
46. Id at 330.
47. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (case remanded
for a determination of whether the relevant labor market for a teaching position in Hazel-
wood includes the city of St. Louis).
48. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977).
49. In 1977, minorities suffered arrests out of proportion to their population in every
state. 1977 Arrest and Race Data by State and County, (Sept. 5, 1979 Unpublished Uniform
Crime Reports computer printout).
50. Compare Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (teaching
1980]
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does not affect most criminal record plaintiffs - those seeking nonspecial-
ized jobs."'
Although Dothard appeared to be an endorsement of the population co-
hort method, its propriety in demonstrating adverse impact was seriously
questioned by the Supreme Court in New York Transit Authority v.
Beazer. 2 The plaintiffs in Beazer were black and Hispanic discharged
employees and rejected applicants who charged that the New York Transit
Authority's blanket exclusion of persons on methadone maintenance 3 vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. In finding that the Transit Authority's prohi-
bition had a disparate impact on members of two minority groups, the
district and appellate courts relied on information that sixty-three percent
of New Yorkers who receive methadone maintenance in public programs
are black or Hispanic. 4 In reversing, the Supreme Court questioned the
sufficiency of this statistic for three reasons. First, since public programs
constituted only sixty-five percent of all methadone maintenance programs
in the area, the majority concluded that it is theoretically possible that the
percentage of blacks and Hispanics enrolled in all methadone maintenance
programs is much lower than sixty-three percent.5 Second, the statistic
did not include an indication of the percentage of minority and nonmi-
position - Court considers the cohort of persons meeting state certification requirements)
with Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (prison guard position - Court considers
the cohort of the general population). See Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of
Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 23-36 (1977).
51. Most of the criminal records cases concern jobs requiring general rather than spe-
cific skills. See Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (office clerk);
Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (factory worker); Carter v. Gal-
lagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (fire fighter); Dozier v.
Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (fire fighter); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of
America, 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aft'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972) (hotel bell-
hop). But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979) (school administrator);
King v. Girard Bank, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (senior computer
programmer).
52. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
53. Methadone maintenance programs are designed to cure heroin addiction. The par-
ticipant takes regular oral doses of methadone in amounts that do not outwardly affect him
but that prevent pleasurable sensations if heroin is used. Methadone in these doses also
alleviates the discomfort ordinarily associated with withdrawal from heroin. Id at 574-75.
54. Id at 585. Blacks and Hispanics comprised a total of 36% of the region's popula-
tion at the time of the 1970 census. Idat 586-87 n.30.
55. Id Justice White, in dissent, however, points to an alternate study that suggests that
blacks and Puerto Ricans are disproportionately represented among methadone users
throughout the metropolitan area. Id at 600-01 (White, J., dissenting).
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nority cohorts who were "otherwise qualified."56 Third, it did not include
the racial and ethnic composition of applicants and of those who were re-
jected on the basis of their current participation in a methadone pro-
gram.
5 7
The rejection of the plaintiffs population group showing and the obser-
vation that no applicant flow analysis was conducted might suggest that
the Court has rejected Dothard and expressed an exclusive preference for
the applicant flow method to demonstrate adverse impact. But the unique-
ness of the methadone maintenance situation that the Court addresses in
Beazer is distinguishable from more typical nontest criteria such as a crim-
inal records ban and a height requirement; the exclusion in Beazer does
not appear to have created a significant chilling effect. Since exclusion was
limited to those who Were currently on methadone maintenance58 as ascer-
tained by a medical test and not as a result of a question on the application
form, it is unlikely that applicants were aware that methadone use was a
basis for rejection. Therefore, although the Court apparently prefers the
applicant comparison demonstration for a situation such as Beazer, it
should continue to accept a population comparison for selection devices
that involve a chilling effect.
Nor should the Court's insistence that the population group comparison
in Beazer be limited to those who are otherwise qualified be interpreted as
a requirement for all cases involving jobs with only general background
requirements. The peculiarities of methadone maintenance undoubtedly
influenced the Court in demanding the more stringent standard. Because
only one-third of the entire methadone maintenance population is employ-
able,59 the Court suggested that evidence of the disparate impact of the
exclusion of those on methadone maintenance be expressed in terms of
those who are otherwise employable.6° In contrast to the methadone
maintenance situation, there is no evidence to suggest that those who are
rejected because of their criminal records are otherwise unqualified in
large numbers. While methadone maintenance users are likely to have
other habits such as drinking and drug abuse that disqualify them in large
numbers, no such tendency is apparent with respect to ex-offenders.
61
56. Id at 585.
57. Id
58. Id. at 570-74.
59. Id at 586 n.28.
60. Id. at 583-87. But see id at 599-600 (White, J., dissenting) (there is no reason to
believe that minority methadone maintenance users are, as a group, otherwise qualified in
smaller numbers than are nonminority methadone maintenance users).
61. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
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Therefore, it does not necessarily follow from Beazer that the Court will
require a showing that all challenged selection criteria have disparate im-
pact with respect to the subcohort of "qualified" persons.
Once the disparate impact of an employment selection device has been
proved, it is not uncommon for an employer to try to escape liability by
showing that his employment practices as a whole do not have a disparate
impact on the protected group.6 2 For example, according to this "bottom
line" theory, a defendant could counter a black plaintifis proof that the
employer's handling of criminal records has a disparate impact on blacks
by showing that the employment selection process as a whole does not
have a disparate impact on blacks - perhaps because other aspects of the
selection procedure favor blacks. Proponents of the bottom line defense
contend that it is unreasonable to punish an employer for the adverse im-
pact of one part of its overall selection procedure when its work force as a
whole is racially balanced.63 This contention assumes, however, that racial
62. See 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 74.42 (1978); B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1191-93 (1973). See also EEOC v. Nav-
ajo Ref. Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 184 (10th Cir. 1979) (employer's use of high school
graduation and aptitude tests which eliminate a disproportionately high number of Spanish-
surnamed applicants does not constitute adverse impact where the percentage of such appli-
cants is greater than their percentage in the labor market); Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492,
497-98 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976) (a showing that there is no discrimi-
nation in the selection process as a whole negates a plaintiff's showing with respect to one
aspect of the selection process). But see Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (the disparate impact of the police department
examination is not neutralized by the fact that the percentage of blacks on the police depart-
ment corresponds to their percentage in the community).
The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures state that as a general princi-
ple, where an employer's total selection process for a particular job does not have an adverse
impact, the federal enforcement agencies will not, in the usual case, exercise their discretion
to prosecute, even where an individual component has an adverse impact. 29 C.F.R. §
1607.4(c) (1979). But in the introduction to the guidelines it is stressed that this "bottom
line" principle reflects an administrative decision on how to use the limited resources of the
enforcement agencies and does not reflect an opinion on the underlying legal issue. 29
C.F.R. § 1607 (1979). Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the adoption of the bottom
line doctrine will influence courts' perceptions of the legal standard. See Note, The Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.- Compromises and Controversies, 28 CATH.
U.L. REV. 605, 629-30 (1979).
The Uniform Guidelines specify that the enforcement agencies will continue to exercise
their regulatory authority against some employment practices even in the absence of a show-
ing that an individual employer's overall selection process has an adverse impact. The agen-
cies will act regardless of the bottom line "where the weight of court decisions or
administrative interpretations holds that a specific selection procedure is. . . not job related
in the same or similar circumstances." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1979). Arrest records and
height requirements are specifically mentioned as falling within this category - conviction
records are not. Id
63. See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 62, § 74.42, at 14-40.
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or ethnic balance is the ultimate determinant of the legality of a selection
procedure under Title VII. However, none of the Supreme Court cases
finding disparate impact even suggest that the discriminatory effect of a
single selection criterion on a protected group may be justified by showing
that a sufficient percentage of the protected group is found in the em-
ployer's work force.64 For instance, in New York Transit Authority v.
Beazer,6 5 the Court noted that the proportion of blacks and Hispanics on
the employer's work force was more than twice their proportion in the
population as a whole, but it did not use this striking fact to mitigate the
illegality of disparate impact on these groups caused by the methadone
maintenance exclusion.66 If the Court had considered the bottom line the-
ory to be at all viable, the overall employment of blacks and Hispanics
would have been held to be a dispositive defense to the disparate impact.
This implicit rejection of the bottom line defense to disparate impact
and this explicit emphasis on the job-relatedness of a criterion strictly com-
port with the manifest intent of Congress in Title VII to promote equal
opportunity for individual job applicants rather than to achieve any racial,
ethnic, or sexual balance in the national work force. Neither the statute
itself, nor the legislative history, indicates that a nonjob-related limitation
leading to an applicant's rejection can be made lawful by the employer's
overall hiring pattern.
It should be remembered that while the absence of an overall disparate
impact is probative of the lack of a discriminatory intent on the part of the
employer, intent is not an element in disparate impact analysis.67 Employ-
ers' use of criminal records has a marked impact on blacks and other mi-
norities; members of these groups have been arrested and convicted in
disproportionate numbers because they have been historically subject to
invidious discrimination. Congress intended that selection criteria with
such effects should not be utilized in employment decisions unless they are
demonstrably job-related. Therefore a plaintiffs showing that a criminal
64. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
65. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
66. Id at 584 n.25. This case is distinguishable from Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978), where the Court found no violation of Title VII because the employer's
practices produced no adverse impact on members of the plaintiffs race. The plaintiff in
Furnco alleged discriminatory treatment while the plaintiffs in Beazer alleged disparate im-
pact. The absence of overall disparate impact is relevant in a discriminatory treatment case
because it provides evidence of the employer's benign intent, but not in a disparate impact
case where intent is not a necessary element. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
67. See note 66 supra.
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record criterion has a disparate impact on members of his group should be
sufficient to establish aprimafacie case of discrimination regardless of the
overall effect of an employer's selection procedure.
B. Job-Relatedness as a Defensefor the Employer
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that an employer's selection device has a
disparate impact by race or other classification, the burden shifts to the
employer to show that the device is "job-related."68 To be job-related, a
selection device must be essential to safety or efficiency,69 have a "manifest
relationship" to the employment in question, 7' have a sufficiently compel-
ling business purpose, and be able effectively to carry out such business
purpose.71 It is well-settled that the fact of arrest or conviction per se can-
not be considered to be an indication of an individual's unsuitability for
any job.72 Likewise, courts have been similarly unsympathetic to employ-
ers' contentions that a particular job is so sensitive that all those with crim-
inal records represent a danger.73
On the other hand, courts pay considerably more attention to an em-
ployer's allegation of job-relatedness when a connection between the char-
acteristics of the job and the plaintiffs specific crime can be proved.74 For
example, in Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, a bellhop was dis-
charged when the hotel became aware of his convictions for theft and re-
ceipt of stolen goods.75 The district court upheld the hotel's policy of
requiring persons with access to guests' property to be free of property-
68. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
69. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1008 (1971). But see Web-
ster v. Richmond, 599 F.2d 793, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1979) (employer's rejection of an applicant
is not in violation of Title VII in the absence of a showing that the employer makes it a
pattern or practice to reject on the basis of an arrest record).
70. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
71. Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 730 n.18 (5th Cir. 1976).
72. In Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975), for example, the
plaintiff, who had been convicted for refusing military induction, was rejected for a position
as a clerk in the personnel office. The court concluded that denying a job opportunity to one
whose crime does not significantly bear on the requirements is not job-related. Id at 1298.
See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
73. This contention has been rejected as it applies to the job of firefighter. See Carter v.
Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Dozier v.
Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836, 851 (S.D. Ohio 1975); and police officer, EEOC Dec. No. 77-3, 19
Fair Empl. Prac. Case. 1129, 1130 (1976).
74. See 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1251, 1258 (1976).
75. 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), artd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
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related crime records.76 In Milwaukee and Suburban Transport Corp. v.
Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations," the Wis-
consin Circuit Court found "keeping cool under pressure" to be a job re-
quirement for a bus driver and accordingly upheld the firing of a driver for
an aggravated assault committed off-duty during a dice game.78 In Lane v.
Inman, 9 the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention that a city ordinance
denying taxi driver permits to persons who have been convicted of narcot-
ics offenses violates the Civil Rights Act of 1866.80 The court summarily
concluded that the ordinance is "obviously job-related."'I
Although the connection between the crime and the job appears to be
self-evident in Richardson, the job-relevance of the crimes in Milwaukee
and Suburban Transport Corp. and Lane is open to question. Further-
more, basic questions on the limits of job relevance have not been settled
in the courts. It is not clear, for example, whether some crimes such as
those of violence and theft can be said to be relevant to most jobs since
virtually all positions involve some interaction with other persons and pro-
vide some access to property.
There are three ways in which the relevance of such crimes could be
limited. The first would limit job-relevance to job situations that are simi-
lar to those of the crime committed. For example, embezzlement would
not be considered job-relevant for an assembly line job which gives the
employee access to raw materials and finished products since stealing such
items is very different in form from embezzlement. The second would
limit job-relevance to situations where the indicated criminal conduct is
directly relevant to major job requirements and where a breach of the pre-
scribed standard constitutes a real threat. Under this limitation, a prohibi-
tion of persons convicted of violent crimes would not be job-relevant with
respect to a factory job since working with things rather than people is the
major part of the job. Also, theft would not be relevant to an office job
where only office equipment could be stolen since routine office security
characteristically provides adequate protection against such theft. A third
possible limitation concerns the distinction between violent or irresponsi-
ble behavior on-and-off the job. By this limitation, applicant behavior
76. Richardson included his conviction on the application form, but the hotel did not
take cognizance of it until three months after he was employed. When a number of thefts
occurred, they went back and checked the records and discharged Richardson among others.
The thefts continued for approximately a month after Richardson was dismissed. Id at 522.
77. 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 261 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1973).
78. Id. at 265.
79. 509 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
81. 509 F.2d at 186.
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such as alcoholism or assault committed during the applicant's private life
is not necessarily held to be relevant to a job that proscribes such conduct
during working hours.8 2  While it appears that there should be some limi-
tations put to the exclusion of all ex-offenders who have committed theft or
violence-related crimes, very little case law and no administrative guide-
lines exist to assist employers in determining when such crimes are job-
relevant.
When the crime is deemed to be relevant to the job, many courts fail to
inquire beyond the mere fact of an applicant's conviction.83 This is inade-
quate because, even if the crime that the individual committed is job-rele-
vant, it does not necessarily follow that its use to eliminate a particular
applicant is job-related. To be job-related, a selection procedure must not
only attempt to measure a given job-relevant factor, but it must do so suc-
cessfully.84 Although conviction for a crime in the past is an indication
that the applicant might have the propensity to commit a similar crime in
the future, the employer should not reach this decision without first consid-
ering other factors, such as the circumstances under which the crime was
committed, the length of time which has passed since the applicant sus-
tained a conviction, and the applicant's recent employment history.
The principle that an employer should consider not only the relevance
of the crime that the applicant committed but also the probability of his
committing it in the future is supported by case law and is reflected in the
validation procedures prescribed in the Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures. In the often-cited case of Green v. Missouri Pacftc Railroad,85
the Eighth Circuit held that the railroad's blanket rejection of all ex-of-
fenders was not job-related because it was not necessary to foster safety
and efficiency. The court concluded that a person's propensity to commit a
crime should be determined by considering each ex-offender and his back-
82. Cf. Whalen v. Volpe, 348 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Minn. 1972) (mem.) (Interstate Com-
merce Commission regulation banning truck drivers convicted of driving while under the
influence of alcohol is "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act in
the absence of evidence that a single DWI conviction is related to subsequent on-the-job
offenses).
83. See Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971).
When the district court determined that the crime for which Richardson was convicted was
relevant to the position that he held, they concluded that the discharge was job-related with-
out consideration of his activities after his conviction.
84. An analogous conclusion was reached by the dissent in Beazer. The minority's po-
sition was that the blanket exclusion of all methadone users was not job-related because the
exclusion of a readily identifiable and severable subcohort - stabilized methadone users
applying for nonsensitive positions - was not job-related. 440 U.S. at 602-04 (White, J.,
dissenting).
85. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
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ground individually.86 Each of the three validation procedures approved
by the Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures encompasses both a
determination that the personal characteristic sought to be measured by
the selection device is relevant to the job and that the test used is an appro-
priate measure of the characteristic.87 In the case of an employer's use of
criminal records, the personal characteristic that the employer is seeking to
measure is the propensity to commit a particular crime. In order to reject
an applicant on that basis, the employer should determine not only that
the propensity is job-relevant but also that the applicant currently exhibits
it. While the applicant's commission of the crime is some evidence, it is
not conclusive; the employer should also consider what the applicant has
done since being arrested. A background investigation will serve to iden-
tify applicants whose recent activities indicate that they no longer exhibit
the propensity to criminal activity.
Requiring a background investigation on every applicant with a job-
relevant criminal record will undoubtedly entail some inconvenience or
expense to the employer. In some instances, the extra expense of consider-
ing a particular applicant can be a "job-related" reason for rejecting him.88
In New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, for example, the Supreme Court
86. Id. at 1298. The court's conclusion that each applicant should be considered indi-
vidually is an application of the Eighth Circuit's job-relatedness standard - it must be
shown that there is not any acceptable alternative procedure that accomplishes the goal with
a lesser differential racial impact. Id See generally Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 107-19 (1974).
87. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b) (1979). The guidelines specify that, where feasible, job-relat-
edness should be determined by reference to either of three statistical procedures: criterion-
related validity, construct validity, or content validity. Criterion-related validity involves
the determination of aspects of work behavior that are relevant to the job, the development
of selection procedures to measure these aspects of work behavior, and the statistical correla-
tion between performance on the selection procedures and performance on criterion meas-
ures of work performance. Content validity consists of the identification of work behavior
required for successful performance and the development of a selection procedure that is
designed to measure the particular work behavior. Content validity is generally available
only where the activity measured on the selection procedure is either identical or closely
related to the work behavior required on the job, such as typing tests. Construct validity
involves the identification of a construct (a cognitive, psychomotor, affective, or other char-
acteristic that has been named and defined), a statistical demonstration that the selection
procedures are related to the construct, and a statistical demonstration that the construct is
related to performance on an important work behavior. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (1979). See
generally M. CONNOLLY & W. CONNOLLY, 1 A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY 379-84 (rev'd ed. 1979); Note, supra note 62, at 610-19.
88. In their concern that Title VII not interfere with business efficiency, Congress struc-
tured the act to make job-relatedness and business necessity the final criteria of a practice's
legality. Note, supra note 86, at 104-05, 108, 114-15. Although job-relatedness is generally
limited to situations where the questioned procedure effectively predicts job performance,
there may be extreme situations where the rejection of an otherwise qualified applicant
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determined that excluding applicants on methadone maintenance from
employment was job-related in part because the necessary screening and
monitoring procedures were much more expensive than those for the typi-
cal applicant.89 But with respect to the use of criminal records, the cost of
examining the relevant factors in an ex-offender's background is not nearly
so great. In order to make an individual determination of the applicant's
suitability, the employer need only gather the type of information that
would surface as a result of a normal background investigation.9° It is
therefore doubtful that the necessity of running such an investigation pro-
vides a job-relatedness justification for rejecting applicants with criminal
records.
C Employers' Use of Arrest Records to Reject Minority Applicants
Although employers can justify their use of conviction records by dem-
onstrating that the records are job-related, it is doubtful that any job-relat-
edness justification exists for rejecting applicants who have been arrested,
but not subsequently convicted. The use of a doubtful conviction record as
a selection device presupposes that the applicant committed the crime for
which he was convicted. While it is likely that persons who have been
convicted of a crime probably committed it, the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that the fact of a person's arrest has little or no probative value to
show that he was engaged in any misconduct. 9' Nevertheless, in Dozier v.
Chupka, one district court suggested that job-related arrests, such as those
for theft, may be used as a screening device in seeking the best
firefighters. 92 Similarly, although the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's (EEOC) general policy prohibits using arrest records to dis-
qualify applicants, it allows employers to reject an applicant for an arrest
involving a "major crime unusually job-related."93 The willingness of
would be deemed to be job-related if hiring the applicant would impose additional costs on
the employer. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 5401 (1979).
89. 440 U.S. at 590 n.33. The Transit Authority would have to determine that the appli-
cant has been in a reliable methadone maintenance program and that he has faithfully
abided by its rules, including strict abstinence from drugs or alcohol. Once he is hired, the
employee's continued abstinence from drugs would have to be monitored. Id
90. The EEOC recommends consideration of the following information about the ap-
plicant: number of criminal acts involved, types of criminal acts, circumstances of the crimi-
nal acts' occurrences, length of time since the conviction, and applicant's recent employment
history. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 5306 (1979). Information of this kind can be col-
lected through the application form, applicant interview, and background and reference
checks that most employers routinely undertake.
91. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1959).
92. 395 F. Supp. 836, 852 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
93. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 5306 (1979).
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these authorities to allow employers to use arrest records when the crime
involved is particularly job-related is misconceived. The seriousness of the
crime and the extent to which it is related to the job for which the appli-
cant is applying is evidence that propensity to commit the crime is job-
related. But it is not evidence that the individual who was arrested has
such a propensity. If a person did not commit the crime, there is no reason
to infer that he is likely to commit it in the future. While it is reasonable to
be cautious with respect to individuals who may pose a danger to employ-
ers, the fact of an arrest for a relevant crime does not, in itself, justify
rejecting the applicant.
Where employers are not justified in using arrest record information, it
follows that they are not justified in soliciting it. If solicited, arrest infor-
mation might well be informally used to evaluate or reject the applicant.
Even if not used to evaluate candidates at all, arrest records should not be
solicited because of their tendency to discourage those with arrest records
from applying.94
D. Discharge of Employees
Not only do employers act on the arrest and conviction records of appli-
cants, but they also respond to the criminal records of their current em-
ployees. Employees may be discharged for criminal acts that occurred
before or after the employee began his employment. An employer will
often discharge an employee for activity that occurred before employment
began when the employer did not become cognizant of the criminal record
or when the employee fabricated the criminal record section of the appli-
cation form. Since Title VII is applicable to employee discharges as well
as selection procedures,9" the legality of an employer's discharge proce-
dure for incumbents with criminal records is determined by application of
the disparate impact and job-relatedness criteria.
When employees are fired for criminal acts that occurred before they
were hired, courts seek to determine disparate impact by the same method
used for an applicant - comparing the effect that the device has on black
and white population cohorts. For example, in Richardson v. Hotel Corp.
ofAmerica, the employer fired the plaintiff when it was noticed that his
application form indicated that he had been convicted of larceny.96 In
94. Several EEOC decisions conclude that the solicitation of arrest information has this
effect. See EEOC Dec. No. 74-02, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 830, 831 (1973); EEOC Dec. No.
72-1005, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 841 (1972).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) (unlawful employment practice to affect adversely a
person's status as an employee because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
96. 332 F. Supp. at 215.
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Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., the corporation withdrew its offer of em-
ployment when the plaintiff filled out a security form indicating that he
had been arrested on fourteen occasions.9 7 In both cases, the courts looked
to the impact that the policy had by race on the population at large rather
than on its impact on the company's employees. This procedure seems
reasonable since the employee is, in effect, an applicant who was hired by
mistake. The group of people affected by the employer's policy is the pool
of actual and potential applicants, rather than the pool of employees.
It is somewhat more difficult to determine how disparate impact is to be
measured when a plaintiff's criminal activity occurred after he had begun
to work for the employer. The EEOC and at least one federal district court
have come to the conclusion that the level of proof acceptable for employ-
ees who are challenging their employer's discharge is the same as for appli-
cants who are challenging rejection.98 These authorities endorse the use of
population cohort evidence to prove that the employer's discharge policy
has a disparate impact on protected groups.
However, two courts have required that plaintiffs demonstrate that the
discharge policy has an adverse impact by reference to the employer's
work force itself. In Robinson v. City of Dallas, the plaintiff had argued
that the city's policy of discharging employees who failed to pay their just
debts had an adverse impact on blacks since blacks are more often in a
default position than are whites.99 The Fifth Circuit concluded that even
if the plaintiff did prove a national pattern, such a showing would be insuf-
ficient."o Although population data has relevance to employer's practices
in selecting employees from the population, the court reasoned that an em-
ployer's practice that affects only employees has a disparate impact only if
the policy has affected employees disproportionately by race.'0 ' In Mc-
Bride v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Sixth Circuit came to the same conclu-
sion in holding that the airline's policy of discharging employees for
conduct unbecoming an employee was not demonstrated to have a dispa-
rate impact where, of the fifteen employees who had been discharged for
97. 316 F. Supp. at 402.
98. EEOC Dec. No. 74-27, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6396 (1973) (employer's
policy of dismissing employees who have had their wages garnished has a disparate impact
on racial minorities); EEOC Dec. No. 72-1497, 4 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. 849, 850 (1972)
(employer's policy of dismissing all employees who suffer convictions has a disparate effect
on blacks because blacks are convicted in disproportionate numbers nationwide). Accord,
Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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criminal conviction, nine were white and four were black.'l"
The Robinson and McBride position has considerable theoretical merit.
One can never be certain that the characteristics of the population at large
are mirrored in the employees of a given corporation. The reason most
often given for allowing population information in determining whether a
given policy has a disparate impact on applicants is that the number of
actual applicants may understate the number who would have applied had
it not been for a chilling effect. Since a discharge policy has no chilling
effect, it is reasonable to prefer a showing of the policy's actual effect on
the corporation's employees. But since such discharges are relatively un-
common, it is very difficult to demonstrate that a policy has a disparate
impact by race by looking only at actual employees. For example, in the
Delta case, assuming that five of the thirteen employees, or 38.5%, were
minorities and that minorities represented eleven percent of Delta's work
force, the percentage of minorities discharged for convictions would be
more than three times their percentage in the work force. But since the
total number of discharges is so small, 1 3 even this 300% disproportionality
does not reach the level of statistical significance. With numbers this
small, it is almost impossible to demonstrate the statistical significance of a
numerical disparity that does exist.
One possible solution would be to allow plaintiffs to supplement the em-
ployment discharge data that they may have with relevant information on
the disparate impact that such policies have on employees with similar
skill levels in similar companies. This approach would assure that employ-
ers do not have to answer for discharge policies when the policies do not
have a demonstrably disparate impact on employees such as their own. At
the same time it would not act to deny plaintiffs their day in court simply
because the number of fellow employees in the same situation is not large
enough to meet the requirements of a statistical test.
The question of how to measure the disparate impact of a discharge also
arises where a plaintiff who falsely reported his criminal record is subse-
quently discharged. The plaintiff may have been fired either for having
committed the crime that he failed to report or for having falsified his
102. 551 F.2d 113, 117 (6th Cir. 1977). Of the remaining two who were discharged, one
was Hispanic. Delta's records do not indicate the race or national origin of the other. Id
103. The fact that there are so few total instances where employees were fired does not in
itself diminish the plaintiffs case that the employer's policy has a disparate impact on
blacks. See Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1295 (8th Cir. 1975) ("The issue to
be examined statistically is whether the questioned employment practice operates in a dispa-
rate manner upon a minority race or group, not whether the individuals actually suffering
from a discriminatory practice are statistically large in number.").
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application form. Where the criminal record is for a job-related convic-
tion, the defendant is clearly justified in discharging the plaintiff on the
basis of the conviction alone. But where the arrest or conviction that was
withheld does not meet the job-relatedness test, the issue of whether the
discharge is valid under Title VII remains.
The conflicting opinions of the EEOC and the Eighth Circuit concern
the determination of disparate impact. The EEOC contends that an em-
ployer's policy of discharging those who have falsified their application
form has a disparate impact on blacks and other minorities. It reasons
that, since these groups have suffered a proportionately higher number of
arrests, they can be expected to be disqualified by falsifications in propor-
tion to the number of arrests."° In Jimerson v. Kisco Co., however, the
Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs showing that blacks are arrested
more frequently did not meet its burden of showing that blacks as a class
were excluded for falsifying arrest records at a higher rate than whites. °5
Although the court's rationale is logical, it does not take into account the
relationship between arrests and the falsification of arrest information.
Since blacks make up eleven percent of the population but account for
twenty-six percent of the arrests," it is clear that the use of arrests has a
very strong disparate impact by race. If white arrestees and black arrestees
were equally likely to falsify arrest data, the use of falsification of arrest
data as a criterion would affect blacks two-and-a-half times as often as it
affects whites. Even if one were to hypothesize that twice as many of the
white arrestees falsify employment application forms as do black arrestees,
falsification of arrest data would still have a disparate impact that is detri-
mental to blacks. Since there is no reason to think that whites who have
been arrested falsify their arrest records any more frequently than do
blacks, it is reasonable to conclude that an employer's policy to discharge
persons who have falsified their arrest data has an adverse impact on
blacks. Nevertheless, if a firing is shown to have a disparate impact, the
firing may be justified by virtue of being job-related. With respect to jobs
where trustworthiness and integrity are necessary qualifications, courts can
be expected to find that the policy of discharging those who have falsified
their application forms is job-related.0 7 Special credence is to be attached
104. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) $ 5304 (1979).
105. 404 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
106. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS - 1977, supra note 8, at 186.
107. See King v. Girard Bank, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 131, 133-35 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(discharge of senior programmer at bank for falsifying his arrest and conviction record on
the application form is job-related because the position requires trustworthiness); Merri-
weather v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 362 F. Supp. 670, 672 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
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to this assertion of job-relatedness because the conduct complained of was
committed against the employer himself - increasing the likelihood that
the employee might engage in future breaches of trust. 1 8 Yet, the irony of
this result is that an employee is being fired for falsifying an answer to a
question that could not have legally barred his employment initially.
E Nonminorily Use of Title VII
If an employer is constrained from using criminal record information
because its use has a "discriminatory impact" on blacks as a group, the
question arises as to whether he is also constrained from using the criminal
record of a white employee or applicant on the grounds that such use
would constitute "discriminatory treatment" of the white person. The is-
sue arises when an employer ceases to use criminal records in evaluating
black applicants but continues to use them with respect to white appli-
cants. A white applicant who was rejected from a job because of his crimi-
nal record could assert that the employer's practice constitutes
discriminatory treatment since he would not have been rejected had he
been black.
One method of proving discriminatory treatment is outlined in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green.' 9 There, a black applicant who had formerly
been employed by the company was not rehired although he was as quali-
fied as white applicants who were hired in his place. McDonnell Douglas
asserted that they did not hire Green because he had participated in an
illegal demonstration against the company. The Supreme Court held that
an unsuccessful applicant can establish a primafacie case of discrimina-
tory treatment by showing that he is a member of a protected minority,
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants, that he was rejected, and that the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of similar qualifications." to The employer
can rebut the primafacie case by demonstrating a valid business purpose
for rejecting the applicant,"' and the plaintiff in turn can submit evidence
to show that the business purpose is a pretext for discriminatory treat-
108. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-04 (1973) (plaintiff's
engagement in an illegal "stall-in" action against the employer is a legitimate business rea-
son justifying employer's refusal to rehire the plaintiff).
109. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
110. Id The Court held that, in asserting that Green was not hired because of his illegal
demonstration against the corporation, McDonnell Douglas had met its burden of proof to
show a valid business purpose. The case was remanded to afford the plaintiff an opportunity
to show that the corporation's reason was actually a pretext. Id at 804-05.
111. Id
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ment." 12
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., the Court expanded
the McDonnell Douglas discriminatory treatment test to apply to members
of the majority as well as members of the minority. " I In Santa Fe, a black
and two white employees were caught stealing. The white men were fired,
but the black man was retained. In announcing the principle that Title VII
invalidates discrimination against members of any race,'"' the Court held
that the plaintiffs' showing that the whites but not the blacks were fired,
although all three committed the same offense, constituted a primafacie
case of discriminatory treatment.' 15
It follows from Santa Fe that an employer who refrains from using ar-
rest and conviction records in selection and discharge procedures when
dealing with blacks should similarly refrain from using such procedures
pertaining to whites. To exempt a black person from rejection or dis-
charge for having a criminal record while holding a white person to this
standard would be sufficient evidence for a white plaintiff to establish a
primafacie case of discriminatory treatment. In order to justify the prac-
tice, the employer would have to show a valid business purpose for treat-
ing the black applicant differently from the white applicant. Such a
demonstration would be difficult at best. Where the employer could not
justify the facially neutral use of criminal records for all applicants as job-
related, he would not be able to justify the selective use of such criteria on
whites alone. His interest in complying with Title VII mandates that he
refrain from using criminal records against blacks when their use has a
disproportionate impact on blacks and cannot be justified as job-related.
But it does not mandate that he continue to apply nonjob-related selection
and discharge standards to whites." 6
The case that has been described here is a very narrow one. A white
applicant or employee could assert disparate treatment only where it could
be shown that in a previous or simultaneous incident, a black applicant or
112. fd at 802.
113. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
114. ". . . Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this
case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and [the black
retained employee] white." Id at 280.
115. Id at 282-84.
116. The Court's decision in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Weber, 99 S. Ct.
2721 (1979), is not applicable to the situation at hand. In Weber, the Court sanctioned the
use of an affirmative action plan that trained blacks and whites in craft skills in order to
counteract the historic effects of the exclusion of blacks from craft unions. Id at 2725. The
proper way to rectify the present discriminatory effect against one race of a single selection
procedure that is not job-related is to eliminate the procedure altogether, not to apply dis-
criminately the discredited criterion to the race that is less affected by it.
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employee had been treated preferentially. In the absence of a parallel case
to demonstrate that the two cases were handled differently, the plaintiff has
not made a McDonnell Douglas showing of discriminatory treatment un-
less he can show in some other way that the company's policy of treating
the two groups differently antedated the rejection of the white applicant.
But the principle, if not the letter of Title VII, suggests that where use of a
selection requirement has a disparate impact on one group and is not job-
related, employers should abandon the requirement rather than apply it to
one group and not the other. "7
While it may seem remarkable that Title VII would bar an employer
from using a selection device to reject a white person because the device
has a disparate impact on black persons, such a result is consistent with the
purposes of Title VII. Title VII is intended to bar discriminatory treat-
ment of persons by race, color, religion, sex, or national origin when not
justified by a valid business purpose as well as facially neutral practices
that have a disproportionate impact and are not job-related. A remedy for
a facially neutral practice that has a disproportionate impact on one group
should not entail the creation of a practice that constitutes discriminatory
treatment against another group.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has the responsibility
to enforce Title VII. While its efforts with respect to employer use of crim-
inal records have thus far been limited to promulgating general employ-
ment selection guidelines that have little relevance to the criminal records
situation' 18 and to investigating complaints of individual plaintiffs, the
Commission can do much more. It should lead the effort to develop and
clarify the legal standards both by producing guidelines on the employ-
ment-related use of criminal records and by bringing suit on its own au-
117. See Judge v. City of Buffalo, 524 F.2d 1321 (2d Cir. 1975) (male caucasian police
department applicant is not barred from challenging minimum height requirement on the
basis of an LEAA guideline that prohibits height requirements because they have a dispa-
rate impact on women and certain minority groups). See generally 3 A. LARSON, supra note
62, § 69.00.
118. It is technically feasible to do a validation study as prescribed by the Uniform
Guidelines on Employment Selection only where: there are sufficient numbers of applicants
such that the findings can reach statistical significance; a range of scores can be produced on
the procedure; and it is possible to devise reliable measures ofjob performance. 29 C.F.R. §
1607.16 (1979). There would almost never be a sufficient number of workers with the appro-
priate types of criminal records, nor could the criminal record criterion produce a range of
scores necessary for a validation process. See note 87 supra.
1980]
Catholic University Law Review
thority. EEOC publicity, research, and enforcement efforts would also
help to ensure employer understanding and compliance.
EEOC guidelines are needed to give employers a single coherent state-
ment of the EEOC's position and to emphasize its commitment to enforc-
ing this application of Title VII. The guidelines should explain, for
example, what methods are appropriate for measuring disparate impact,
whether the bottom line defense is valid with respect to criminal records,
and how job-relatedness is to be determined. When necessary, the EEOC
should seek to strengthen the authority of its guidelines by bringing suits to
clarify disputed issues such as the EEOC position that an exclusion, to be
job-related, must take into account an individual's background." 9
Publicity of several kinds can be helpful. Employers should not only be
apprised of the legal requirements but should also be assured that ex-of-
fenders can be successful employees and informed of the ways in which
these workers have been successfully integrated into the work force of
other businesses. Information directed to employees and to inmates who
are seeking employment would help to ensure that they will be knowledge-
able of their rights under Title VII.
The EEOC should also generate research to assist employers and courts
in determining the job-relatedness of certain types of work. For example,
in order to gauge job-relatedness, it would be helpful to know the rate of
employee crime for different categories of jobs and the extent to which ex-
offenders are responsible for the reported offenses. It would also be help-
ful to know more about the demographic characteristics and employment
histories of recidivists and nonrecidivists.
Finally, the EEOC should require employers to examine their criminal
record collection and use policies in comparison with EEOC's arrest and
conviction record guidelines, just as they require employers to examine
their overall work force distribution. Modifications, when necessary,
should be made a matter of voluntary compliance in a fashion parallel to
that of affirmative action.
IV. CONCLUSION
Title VII has an enormous potential for restricting and rationalizing em-
ployers' use of criminal records to hire and fire employees. Unfortunately,
the Act's potential in this regard remains unfulfilled. Under the Act, an
employer's use of such records is invalid if the use has a disparate impact
on a group within the purview of Title VII unless the employer can
demonstrate that the procedures are job-related. Since minorities suffer a
119. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
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disproportionately large number of arrests and convictions, employers' use
of these records is often subject to the job-relatedness standard. However,
the available survey data suggests that employers in large numbers collect
and utilize criminal record information in ways prohibited by Title VII.
The disparity between what the law appears to require on the one hand
and contrary practices of a great number of employers on the other can be
explained in two ways. First, courts do not agree on how disparate impact
should be measured or in giving content to the concept of job-relatedness.
Second, federal efforts at enforcement have been inadequate since admin-
istrative action has been limited to investigating complaints.
In general, plaintiff-applicants should be deemed to have demonstrated
that a criminal record selection criterion has an adverse impact when they
show that the criterion would negatively affect a significantly greater per-
centage of minorities than nonminorities among the regional populace.
Plaintiffs who are discharged employees, however, should generally be re-
quired to make a more exacting demonstration of adverse impact.
In order to prove that their use of conviction records is job-related, em-
ployers should have to demonstrate that the crime committed is specifi-
cally relevant to the job applied for and that the applicant has the
propensity to engage in that criminal conduct. Along these lines, employ-
ers who routinely collect and utilize arrest records violate the nature and
spirit of Title VII. Since an arrest not followed by a conviction does not
constitute evidence that the applicant committed the crime, arrest records
can rarely, if ever, be considered job-related. Where their use has a dispa-
rate impact, arrest records should be neither solicited nor utilized in the
selection process.
The disparity between the legal principles and practices will not be elim-
inated until the legal issues that cause justifiable confusion in the business
community are eliminated and until the business community is pressed
into action. Accordingly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion should use its authority to clarify the relevant legal standards and to
promote adherence to them.
Michael Genz
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